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Usage Management Enforcement in Cloud Computing Virtual Machines

By
Edward J. Nava
Associate of Science, Electronic Engineering Technology
Bachelor of Science, Electrical Engineering
Master of Science, Electrical Engineering
Doctor of Philosophy, Engineering

ABSTRACT
Many are interested in adopting cloud computing technology, but have concerns
about the security of their data. This issue has motivated extensive research to
address potential vulnerabilities, with a major focus on access control. A related
cloud computing concern is controlling what users can do with data to which they
have been granted access. This control is needed to prevent accidental loss or
deliberate theft of data by users who have been granted legitimate access. The
need for this control, called usage management, has led to a number of
conceptual approaches for both conventional and cloud computing, all of which
will require an enforcement mechanism within the processor’s domain. The goal
of this research is to prove that it is possible to implement a completely softwarebased enforcement mechanism that can operate independently of the application
software. The implementation is based on a formal operational model. A
number of implementation approaches were considered in formulating the
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enforcement strategy. Then, leveraging software instrumentation capabilities
and extending tools developed for taint analysis, we developed a software-based
usage management enforcement mechanism that uses dynamic data flow
tracking. Based on usage flow policies that are specified in machine readable
licenses, the enforcement mechanism can permit or inhibit data flows to standard
interfaces, data files, and network sockets. The enforcement mechanism does
not require direct hardware access, so it can be used very effectively in a cloud
computing environment. This demonstrated capability now provides information
owners an ability to control what authorized users can do with the information.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
Computing environments have evolved significantly over the last fifty
years. Early computers executed programs in a sequential mode, where the
entire system was devoted to executing one single program at a time. With this
batch mode, there were no concerns about information inadvertently flowing from
one program to another as the system could be powered down between jobs to
eliminate any data remnants. Processing data of varying sensitivity levels was
straightforward, though turn-around time could be lengthy.
Later, time-shared systems were developed to provide multiple users an
ability to simultaneously access the machine for software development and
timely execution of programs. The multiprocessing operating systems provided
an environment where users had access to all of the machine resources, though
they were shared with other users. The storage devices were capable of storing
multiple users’ files, so the systems included capabilities for users to designate
who could access their files, though privileged users could override these access
controls. This type of Discretionary Access Control (DAC) capability is still used
in today’s operating systems.
The early computers were very expensive, so there was a high level of
interest in being able to use them to process information of different sensitivity
levels simultaneously. Processing data of different sensitivity levels would
require rigorous controls for data access and transmission. These needs
inspired much of the initial research on Multi-Level Security Systems, Flow
Control, and Covert Channels.
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As computer hardware technology advanced and procurement costs
decreased, some organizations chose to use isolated systems for processing
sensitive information. Economical personal computer technology was another
catalyst for the use of isolated systems. Information brought into an isolated
system might be read-in using removable media, which would then be destroyed
or thereafter be handled as data of the same sensitivity level as the target
machine. Any data removed from the high level system would use a rigorous
human review process to ensure that no sensitive data was being extracted
inadvertently.
Network communications have greatly impacted computing environments
as now vast quantities of information can quickly be accessed and shared.
Organizations processing sensitive data have adopted network technology to
improve capabilities and effectiveness, but these systems have usually been
configured to maintain complete isolation from public networks.
A large fraction of historical network usage has been based on a clientserver model, where a user’s machine operates as a client that regularly
requests information from servers and occasionally, sends a significantly smaller
amount of data back to the server. Today, web applications are evolving from
simple content servers and provide much more functionality including data
storage, web-hosted email services, and other applications that were formerly
executed on client machines. Many of these web applications are operated by
companies such as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft and as they have built up
computing facilities to host these web applications, they and others have

2

developed extensive computing enterprises that they now rent portions of to
other users. In this mode of operation, the users are physically removed from the
computing resources that are executing their applications and from their
perspective; the supporting resources are figuratively located in the “clouds”.
Many organizations are adopting cloud computing in order to reap the
benefits of being able to quickly and economically establish an extensible
computing enterprise. Other organizations are also interested in the technology,
but are hesitant to adopt it because of concerns over the security of their
information. These concerns provide the motivation for extensive research
regarding information security in cloud computing systems.
A major objective of information security is to provide information owners
an assured ability to control who has access to their data. Usage Management
(UM) compliments access control by providing an ability to control what a user
can do with data once they have been legitimately granted access (Park &
Sandhu, 2004) (Jamkhedkar, Heileman, & Lamb, 2010). In other words, a
comprehensive UM system includes both an access control and continuous
policy-based enforcement capability.
Usage Management has some common objectives with Digital Rights
Management (DRM). A DRM system manages the appropriate use of digital
content and its objective is to prevent the illegal use of licensed content; the
primariy motivation for using DRM is to prevent loss of revenue (Subramanya &
Yi, 2006) (Liu, Safavi-Naini, & Sheppard, 2003).
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DRM uses licenses, which are separate from the content whose use is
being controlled. The content may be encrypted or encoded in a proprietary
format that is suitable for tracking and management of its usage; the content
cannot be used without a valid license. So, in order to use the content, the
consumer must purchase a license granting usage rights and these rights are
often tied to a particular client machine. Consumer devices which use the
content must be able to properly interpret the usage rules specified in the license.
Applications which play DRM protected content must be augmented with plug-ins
by the DRM provider in order to access the digital content. Digital content
protected by one DRM system cannot be accessed by the client-side application
in another DRM system, so applications may need multiple plug-ins. Also, some
DRM systems rely on hardware to both identify the client machine as well as
implement cryptographic functions needed to access the content. The need to
ensure that applications are extended with DRM capabilities and potential
dependence on hardware interactions limits the use of DRM. In view of the
issues with DRM, a usage management capability which does not require
hardware access or cooperative applications is essential for use in cloud
computing.
Cloud computing is a broad term, which includes various service models.
This research is focused on the Infrastructure as a Service model (IaaS) (Liu, et
al., 2011) (Badger, Grance, Patt-Comer, & Voas, 2011).

With the IaaS model,

the cloud subscriber controls both the operating system and application software
executing in Virtual Machines (VMs) and the cloud computing provider has
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control of the hardware and the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) (also known as
hypervisors) that hosts the user's VMs, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Infrastructure-As-A-Service (IAAS) Control

With IaaS, the ability to instantiate VMs is a key function. A cloud user
can configure the VMs, which provides an opportunity to add mechanisms for
information security or usage management. As the cloud user may not have
control of, or access to, the actual hardware or software hosting their VMs,
software executing within the VM must provide the desired protections and
control mechanisms.
Computing systems incorporate a hierarchical design as shown in Figure
2. The operating system manages all system resources and provides the
environment in which the application software executes. When the application
software requires access to any system resources, it uses a library function call,
such as printf(), which in turn results in an operating system call to access the
desired resource. The operating system uses device driver software to access
5

hardware resources. There are two logical interfaces where additional control
functionality can be added: between the application layer and the operating
system, and between the operating system and the hardware. VMMs, use the
latter interface to isolate operating system access to the hardware. This
hierarchy can be leveraged for enhancing information security or for system
exploitation. This hierarchy can also be used for usage management
enforcement mechanisms.

Figure 2 Hierarchical Computation Configuration

As consumers, many of us interact with public cloud computing services
provided by commercial entities such as: Amazon, Google, Apple, and Microsoft.
However, some organizations choose to implement cloud computing systems
using their own resources and they are called private clouds. For example, the
Department of Defense has a private system which is called milCloud. With a
6

private cloud, the owning organization can have consolidated systems that are
easier to control and administer, and it has complete control of the entire
hardware and software suite. This complete control provides a greater ability to
protect its information. The downside is that it must make the financial investment
to buy and operate the system. For this reason, "renting" computing resources
from a public cloud computing provider is very attractive; the downside is lack of
control.
As noted, the UM concept includes the ability to control how a user, who
has been granted legitimate access, uses the data. Existing models that
describe UM operations assume the existence of an enforcement mechanism
within the target processor. However, no one has proposed a specific approach
for implementing the enforcement mechanism. The fundamental objective of this
research is to answer the questions:
It is possible, using a completely software-based approach, to implement a
usage management enforcement mechanism within a specific processor
environment, and in particular, a virtual one that is executing in a public cloud
computing environment? Can a usage management capability be implemented
without modifying the applications software? Can the capability be implemented
with no changes to the guest operating system?
To illustrate why a usage management enforcement capability is needed,
consider the following real-life scenario: In 2014, the Russian Federation hosted
the Winter Olympics in Sochi (Olympics.org, 2014). Prior to the Olympics, there
were concerns about possible terrorist activities intended to disrupt the Olympics.

7

In addition, there have been ongoing political tensions amongst the participating
countries, but circumstances required their law enforcement and intelligence
communities to share information in order to assure the safety of the athletes and
spectators during the event. The countries providing information likely wanted to
limit how broadly their sensitive information was shared by host country analysts
using the data. For this kind of situation, having a community cloud computing
environment that includes an automatic means of controlling how data are used
would be very desirable.
Usage management can also be very beneficial in environments where
organizations seek to limit how their employees download data from their work
computer systems. There are numerous examples of where employees have
downloaded sensitive data to their laptop computers and then lost the laptops, or
had them stolen. Being able to prevent these unwanted downloads could also be
very desirable.
In this dissertation, a formal description of the usage management
enforcement mechanism operation is provided. This is followed by a review of a
set of existing technical capabilities that are routinely used to secure information
and an assessment of their applicability to this problem. Next, related research
and highlight implementation strategies that may lend themselves to usage
management enforcement are presented. This is followed by a discussion of the
experimental configurations that were used to test the proposed UM enforcement
mechanism with a summary of the results and their significance. Finally, the
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effectiveness of this approach is assessed and areas of future research that can
augment the demonstrated capability are identified.
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Chapter 2 – An Operational Model for Usage Management
Before proposing a solution, it is necessary to provide a comprehensive
description of what the usage management enforcement mechanism is supposed
to do. For this purpose, historical information security research is very
appropriate, as the fundamental problems have not changed much since the
early 1970’s.
Information security concerns have existed since the time when multiple
users shared access to central computing systems. There was a need to
process information of different sensitivity levels on these machines and there
was also a requirement to ensure that users could only access information for
which they were authorized. In this type of environment, non-sensitive data can
be accessed by all users; as the sensitivity level increases, the set of users who
can assess the data is increasingly restricted. This type of operation is called a
Multi-Level Security (MLS) system. Early MLS implementation needs motivated
considerable research, and one of the first security models was proposed by Bell
and LaPadula (Bell & LaPadula, 1973) (LaPadula & Bell, 1996). We can relate
this model to usage management and the actions of the enforcement
mechanism.
The Bell LaPadula model has three components which the authors call:
(1) the simple security principle, (2) the * principle, and (3) the tranquility
principle. The three principles can be described both in general terms and in a
formal mathematical way. The simple security principle means that a user is
prohibited from reading all information that is at a higher sensitivity level than for
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which he or she is authorized. The * principle restricts a user from writing
information to any level below that for which he or she has active object access.
The tranquility principle states that the security classification of active objects will
not be changed during normal operations. The first two principles (sometimes
called properties by some authors) are often stated as "no-reads-up" and "nowrites-down" (Bishop, 2003). (For the rest of this document, the three
components are referred to as properties.)
An MLS system is typically uses security levels and compartments within
each level. For simplicity, assume that all information is in one compartment.
Higher security levels imply higher levels of sensitivity, so it is mandatory that
information from the higher levels not flow to the lower levels.
Subjects, or users, are approved for access by sensitivity levels.
However, authorized access to information at a given level does mean that a
subject can access all information at that level. In a military security model, the
access restrictions within a level are called need to know. While level
authorization is a necessary condition for access of an object a given level, it is
not a sufficient condition on which to grant access.
The Bell LaPadula model is a lattice-based Mandatory Access Control
(MAC) system which references an access control matrix entry to determine if a
subject, S, is allowed to access an object, O. Because it is a MAC system, the
user (subject) is not allowed to change the security attributes of any object.
As noted, a comprehensive UM system includes both an access control
capability and the means to enforce usage policies while the object is in use. In
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a cloud computing environment with a hierarchical UM system, a centralized
access control function is implemented outside of the VM and is responsible for
implementing the simple security property. The UM enforcement mechanism
within the VM must enforce the * property and the tranquility property; it must be
capable of preventing the flow of information from objects of higher sensitivity
categories to objects of lower sensitivities.
To illustrate more formally, assume that we have a data set, A, at a high
sensitivity level and another, B, at a lower level. Then we say that A dominates
B, or in a shorthand notation 𝐴 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐵. If 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝐵, then an assignment

statement which is moving data from 𝑥 to 𝑦 in an executing program, i.e. 𝑦 = 𝑥,

would not be allowed, as it would violate the * property. To enforce this

constraint, a system must detect flows of information from the higher sensitivity
levels to the lower sensitivity levels. In contrast, an assignment instruction of the
form 𝑥 = 𝑦 would be allowed, as it is in compliance with the simple security
property, i.e. "read down".

The two assignment statements shown in the previous paragraph
represent simple examples of explicit information flow. Assignment statements
can include other modifiers such as: AND, OR, XOR, ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV, etc.
that while modifying the original data, still constitute explicit data flows. Another
class of instructions, which change execution paths based on the values of 𝑥,
may result in implicit data flows that are also a concern. In this research, the
focus will be on explicit data flows.
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Recognition of the information flow problem in MLS systems led to
extensive research to detect and control the flow of information. Bishop
describes the properties of information flow and some of the approaches which
have been proposed to detect and prevent unwanted information flow. An
information flow policy can be expressed as a triple, 𝐼 = (𝑆𝐶𝐼 , ≤𝐼 , 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝐼 ), where

𝑆𝐶𝐼 is a set of security classes, ≤𝐼 is an ordering relation, such as 𝑑𝑜𝑚, and 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝐼

combines two elements of 𝑆𝐶𝐼 .

A variation of Foley's confinement flow model can be used to illustrate the

operation of a UM mechanism within a VM (Foley, 1989). The confinement flow
model is a 4-tuple (𝐼, 𝑂, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒, →), in which 𝐼 = �𝑆𝐶𝐼 , ≤, 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝐼 � is a lattice-

based information flow policy; 𝑂 is a set of entities; →: 𝑂 × 𝑂 is a relation with
(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ → if and only if information can flow from 𝑎 to 𝑏; and for each 𝑎 ∈ 𝑂,

𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒 (𝑎) is a pair (𝑎𝐿 , 𝑎𝑈 ) ∈ 𝑆𝐶𝐼 × 𝑆𝐶𝐼 , with 𝑎𝐿 ≤ 𝑎𝑈 . What this means is that
for 𝑎 ∈ 𝑂, if 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎𝑈 , then information can flow from 𝑥 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 and if 𝑎𝐿 ≤ 𝑥,

information can flow from 𝑎 𝑡𝑜 𝑥. Therefore, if information can flow from 𝑎 𝑡𝑜 𝑏,
then 𝑏 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎 and this becomes:

(∀ 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑂)[𝑎 → 𝑏 ⇒ 𝑎𝐿 ≤𝐼 𝑏𝑈 ]

(1)

In Foley's model, there is an assumption that an object can change
security classification, which is contrary to the Bell LaPadula tranquility property.
For this research effort, the object security classifications are fixed. If data or
user security classifications change, the centralized UM controller can terminate
the execution in the VM, if necessary.
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The operation that is shown in equation 1 represents the fundamental
action that a UM enforcement mechanism within a VM must perform. Sensitive
information to be controlled dominates all non-sensitive information; flows from
the sensitive to non-sensitive must be prevented.
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Chapter 3 – Potential Solutions Using Existing Technical
Capabilities
Before proposing a solution for enforcing usage management within a VM,
it is useful to examine whether existing technologies can be used to accomplish
the objective of preventing a user from misusing the data to which he or she has
been granted access. This chapter presents several technologies that are
currently in use and discusses why they will not achieve the desired goals.
Information usually has value to the owner. The consequence of loss may
range from personal embarrassment or personal privacy concerns, to significant
financial or national security consequences. The value generally determines the
extent of the measures that information owners are willing to use to protect it. In
the case of high-value information, the importance of protecting it has justified the
large expense of completely segregating the information processing systems or
establishing extensive infrastructure to support security functions. It may also
justify a significant amount of processing overhead to provide ongoing protection
of data. For many organizations, operating completely isolated systems is not a
viable approach, leading to the use of the protection techniques described here.
The widespread availability of high speed computer network
communications has made cloud computing a very attractive option, but the
information security concerns are even greater as the users no longer have
physical control of the computing resources. However, the technologies
described here can be used to provide users assurance that data at rest and
data in transit are secure. Extensions of these technologies may also be
15

considered for protecting data in use in cloud computing VMs. They are
described below.
3.1 Encryption
When thinking about information security, one approach that immediately
comes to mind is encryption (Schneier, 1996). If data are stored in an encrypted
form, then, assuming that the encryption is highly resistant to attack, there is less
concern if remnants of the data remain after a delete operation. Similarly,
encrypted data is generally safe when being transferred from a cloud storage
repository to a virtual machine for processing. Depending on the application, the
data may need to be decrypted for effective use within a VM.
When considering using encryption, one must consider the
implementation details carefully to ensure that the encryption does not provide a
false sense of security. Let us consider some of the issues. First, using an
encryption algorithm, 𝐸, and an encryption key, 𝐾𝐸, we generate a ciphertext, 𝐶,

that is an encrpyted version of the original message, 𝑀. The encryption process
is represented by the following formula:

C = EKE (M)

(2)

To use the data for subsequent use, the data must be decrypted using a
decryption algorithm, 𝐷, and a decryption key, 𝐾𝐷, to recover the message, 𝑀.
M = DKD (C)

(3)

Generally, the algorithms for encryption and decryption are publicly known
and the secrecy is associated with the keys. With symmetric encryption
algorithms, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption, i.e. 𝐾𝐸 =
16

𝐾𝐷. Keeping the key secret is essential for ensuring that the ciphertext will be

secure; there is a significant challenge in securely distributing the key to all
parties engaged in the communication of the data. Generally, keys are

distributed through a means other than the data communication channel, such as
paper tapes, code books, and electronic storage devices. If many users
communicate using the same key, the potential for compromise increases. For
example, in the 1980s, the US Navy experienced very significant fleet-wide
security compromises when the secret keys were compromised by John Walker
(Richelson, 1995).
An alternative approach is to use an asymmetric encryption algorithm,
where two different keys are used for the encryption and decryption processes.
Users have both a public key,𝐾𝐸, and a private key, 𝐾𝐷. A sender encrypts a
message using the receiver's public key. The message can then only be
decrypted using the receiver's private key. As with symmetric algorithm
encryption, asymmetric algorithm encryption has key security challenges, as well;
the user's private keys must be generated or distributed securely, and measures
are needed to assure that a published public key actually belongs to the intended
recipient.
Both symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms are in widespread
use today to protect information from unauthorized access. Because of
processing efficiencies, asymmetric encryption is typically used in the initial
stages of a prolonged communication session, to exchange an encrypted
symmetric key; subsequent communication in the session is done using
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symmetric encryption. Encryption is also used to secure data in storage, often
using hardware for part of the implementation.
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
RSA is an example of an asymmetric key algorithm that, in its basic form,
has some weaknesses (Paar & Pelzl, 2010). One specific property of interest for
this discussion is that it is malleable. To put the characteristic in perspective, first
consider the encryption and decryption algorithms, where 𝐾𝐸, 𝐾𝐷, and 𝑛 are

derived in a key generation process not shown here. The encryption and

decryption algorithms use exponentiation and the modulus functions as shown
below:
C = M KE mod n
M = CKD mod n

(4)
(5)

If the attacker replaces the ciphertext 𝐶 with 𝑆 𝐾𝐸 𝐶, where 𝑆 is some integer, then

when the receiver decrypts the modified ciphertext, he gets:
(S KE C)KD = S KE KD M KE KD = S M mod n

(6)

While an attacker does not get access to the original message, he is able to
modify it in a way that could be harmful. The malleability property illustrates the
characteristic that is the basis for homomorphic encryption, where an ability to
modify ciphertext in a predictable way may be useful.
Gentry proposed a fully homomorphic encryption method that allows any
efficiently computable function, 𝑓, to be applied to encrypted data so that a user

can manipulate data in a useful way without ever actually having access to the
unencrypted data (Gentry, 2010). This is done using an Evaluate algorithm
18

which generates a modified cipher text. Here, 𝐶′ represents an encrypted

version of 𝑓(𝑀) and 𝐶 represents the encrypted version of 𝑀. The process is
illustrated with the following equation:

C′ = EvaluateKE (f, C)

(7)

Fully homomorphic encryption could be attractive for some cloud
computing applications. Encrypted data could be downloaded into a virtual
machine, processed using a set of arbitrary functions, and then stored back in
the data storage repository. There are concerns on the practicality of
homomorphic encryption; Lauter et al. show that schemes that are limited to a
small number of functions can be much faster than fully homomorphic schemes,
and can indeed be practical (Lauter, Naehrig, & Vaikuntanathan, 2011). There
are limits to the usefulness of homomorphic encryption because in most
situations, a user will actually need access to the unencrypted data, so
alternative approaches are necessary.
3.3 Trusted Platform Module
Any software that is used to provide a means of information security is
vulnerable to software attack. The Trusted Platform Module, TPM, is a separate
hardware microcontroller that can securely store keys, certificates, and
signatures. It includes a math-coprocessor that implements cryptographic
operations such as asymmetric key generation, asymmetric algorithm encryption,
hashing, and random number generation (TCG, 2011). The TPM standard was
developed by the Trusted Computing Group, but the actual devices are
manufactured by industrial companies and have been integrated into most
19

modern laptop, desktop, and server computers. The TPM has been used by
Microsoft in its implementation of BitLocker®. In private cloud computing
systems, the owning organization has complete control over the system, so a
TPM could be used to enhance the overall system security. In public cloud
computing systems, the cloud subscriber does not have direct access the TPM,
so it would not be a useful resource.
Both encryption and the TPM can contribute to security of data in cloud
computing, but neither offers an effective means of controlling what a user is
allowed to do with data for which he or she has been granted legitimate access.
Homomorphic encryption could provide some benefit, but its usefulness is
limited.
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Chapter 4 – Related Research
As mentioned earlier, previous UM related research, along the likes of
Park and Jamkhedkar, has not yielded an enforcement mechanism that can be
used in a VM. However, there is a considerable amount of related research that
provides the foundation for this effort. This review first examines research on
protecting information in cloud computing systems, with the objective of
identifying tactics that can be applied to the UM enforcement problem. Then,
previous UM research is reviewed to illustrate the role of the enforcement
mechanism and to further justify the need for this capability. This is followed by a
review of research on dynamically tracking data flows within a system. This
capability, Data Flow Tracking (DFT), is often used to determine how data
propagates from a network source through a system; the approach is called taint
analysis. Because of the need to track how information flows within a VM, DFT
is a capability which is necessary for UM enforcement.
4.1 Information Security in Cloud Computing Systems
In cloud computing systems, data can be encrypted while in storage and
while in transit. Once it is in a VM, it must usually be decrypted to be used. The
information owners are concerned that it can now be accessed by others while it
is in use. The research examples shown below are intended to address this
concern. One irony, as shown in the last example is that the same strategies
that are used to protect data can also be used to steal data.
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4.1.1 CloudVisor
CloudVisor is intended to address a cloud computing subscriber's
concerns that data in the subscriber’s VMs may be accessed by other users' VMs
that are jointly tenant on the same set of hardware (Zhang, Chen, Chen, & Zang,
2011). It also protects data in VMs by preventing access by the cloud provider's
administrators and cloud management tools. It accomplishes this by inserting a
security monitor underneath the commodity VMM, in a configuration that is called
nested virtualization. When CloudVisor is booted, it elevates the commodity
VMM to execute in a less privileged mode. CloudVisor only allows an authorized
VM access to unencrypted data and all other access will be directed towards an
encrypted version of the data. It uses the TPM to check software integrity. For
private cloud applications, it can be a viable protection concept.
4.1.2 Overshadow
Overshadow protects information in virtual machines by taking advantage
of the extra level of memory mapping in the VMM that is necessary to support
VMs (Chen, Garfinkel, Lewis, & Subrahmanyam, 2008). Instead of using the
conventional one-to-one mapping of guest physical addresses to machine
physical addresses, Overshadow uses a one-to-many mapping strategy so that,
depending on context, different memory views are provided. The approach is
called multi-shadowing. Cloaking uses the multi-shadowing capability to access
encrypted or unencrypted versions of data, depending on context. Overshadow
introduces a shim into the address space of a cloaked application, which
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cooperates with the VMM to mediate all interactions with the operating system.
The VMM identifies the guest context and maps it to an appropriate shadow page
table, providing access to either encrypted or unencrypted data. Because of the
role that the VMM plays in identifying guest context and switching between
multiple shadow page tables, the approach is best suited to private cloud
computing installations.
4.1.3 SubVirt
CloudVisor is inserted underneath a commodity VMM in order to protect
data in an individual VM. In a similar manner, SubVirt inserts a VMM underneath
a commodity operating system in order to provide control (King & Chen, 2006).
By elevating a target operating system into a VM, the VMM now can host
malicious software that cannot be detected or controlled by the operating system
or application software; ultimate control of a system is in the lower levels. While
this research is not devoted to developing ways to introduce malicious software,
the SubVirt system clearly demonstrates how an operating system and the
associated application software can be controlled (or in this case, subverted) with
a VMM.
4.1.4 Cloud Information Security Implementation Considerations
Virtualization is the essential capability that enables extensible IaaS cloud
computing systems. In a public IaaS system, the cloud service provider has
complete control of the hypervisor and the underlying hardware resources; a
cloud user can only implement mechanisms in the layers above the provider's
hypervisor.
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To address information security concerns, one approach that might be
considered is writing a custom operating system and associated application
software for use in the VM. This would give the user the ability to control all
facets of operation, but is an unrealistic approach because today, few
organizations are willing to invest in the resources needed to develop custom
operating systems and applications. For example, before the mid-1990’s, most
US military systems were based on custom designed hardware and software.
Today, the military relies extensively on Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
hardware and software products for many mission critical applications, because
of lower life-cycle costs. In view of this trend of increasing reliance on COTS
products, we must consider approaches that can provide the desired control
without the need to modify the large universe of application software that might
be used. Ideally, a control capability would also require minimal, if any, changes
to the operating system software.
Cloud computing information security research is primarily focused on
preventing unauthorized individuals from accessing information at rest, in transit,
or while in use. Current cloud computing information security research does not
address control of how data are used once a user has authorized access.
4.2 Usage Management
Usage management provides information owners an assured ability to
control who has access to their data and an ability to control what a user can do
with data, once they have been legitimately granted access. This research area
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has evolved from early DRM work that was done with the objective of protecting
copyrighted material that is distributed electronically.
With today’s highly networked computing environment, users can easily
transmit very large amounts of data in a short amount of time. Users can also
quickly download data to high speed and high density media, such as thumb
drives and portable disk drives. While these capabilities can be very convenient
when there are no concerns about ownership or sensitivity of the data, they can
also be a significant problem if owners do not want their data freely
disseminated. A need for automatic control of how digital data are used has
been the motivation for the research efforts described herein.
4.2.1 UCONABC
The UCONABC work introduced a conceptual framework that moves
beyond traditional access control systems, which use server-side mechanisms
and an access matrix to make access decisions (Park & Sandhu, 2004). This
work introduced models that integrate the Authorizations (A), oBligations (B), and
Conditions (C) that are a foundation for UM systems. A significant extension that
they proposed is the notion of continuous control of resources for which access
has been granted. In their work, they noted that to provide control within a client,
a client-resident trusted computing base and a reference monitor are needed for
enforcement. However, they did not address this need, as their focus was on the
operational model.

25
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Subjects
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Obligations
(B)

Conditions
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Figure 3 UCONABC model components.

The UCONABC work is intended to encompass the DRM capability, where
the information provider retains some control over what the user can do with it.
The operational models have a rich set of characteristics that can be considered
in making access decisions but this discussion will focus on ongoing control.
The structure is illustrated in Figure 3. The UCONABC models consider the
subjects, S, subject attributes, SA, objects, O, and object attributes, OA. Rights,
R, are privileges that a subject can hold and exercise on an object and can
include consumer rights, CR, and provider rights, PR. Authorizations, A, are
functional predicates that have to be evaluated for usage decisions. oBligations,
B, are functional predicates that verify mandatory requirements a subject has to
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perform before or during usage. Conditions, C, are environmental or systemoriented decision factors.
We can use the UCONpreA0 model to represent the action of the data-flowbased enforcement mechanism. We use L, which is a lattice of security labels
with the dominance relation, ≤, and functions: : 𝑆 → 𝐿, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒: 𝑆 → 𝐿, and
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: 𝑂 → 𝐿. The lattice is first used to make the decision to allow a

subject to access an object, based on the clearance level and conditions of the
subject and the classification of the object. Then, the lattice can provide the
information that will be used by an enforcement mechanism to govern data flows,
using the following function:
allowed(o1 , o2 , write) ⇒ classi�ication(o1 ) ≤ classi�ication(o2 )

(8)

This is consistent with the ∗ property that was presented previously.
4.2.2 An Interoperable Usage Management Framework

Jamkhedkar et al. proposed a framework for UM in open, distributed
environments that emphasizes interoperability (Jamkhedkar, Heileman, & Lamb,
2010). Their system is a combination of the access control and usage control
functions of the UCONABC system and Digital Rights Management (DRM). DRM
includes content management, license management, specification of usage
rules, and simple access control. A key observation that they make is that the
UM policies must be tightly coupled to a data resource because resources will
typically be moved to locations that are not specifically known A Priori. They also
recognize that each computing environment must have the capability to both
interpret a policy language and enforce the policy. Their framework uses
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licenses, in which the policies are expressed. The licenses are interpreted and
enforced within a computation environment.
This system has two operational stages: a setup stage and a working
stage. In the setup stage, the computational environment is set up and the
license is generated. In the working stage, the license is interpreted as needed
for enforcement in operational environment and then the policies stated in the
license are enforced in the computational environment. This work was focused
on the theoretical framework and did not propose any means of enforcement.
4.2.3 Usage Management in Cloud Computing
Jamkhedkar et al. later presented a concept for UM in cloud computing
(Jamkhedkar, Lamb, & Heileman, 2011). This concept built on their previous
design of an open, interoperable framework. They consider an operational
environment consisting of systems that are operated by different cloud computing
providers. The diverse set of systems necessitates a common cloud ontology so
that policies can be specified and enforced consistently in each. As before, they
propose a setup phase and a working phase. The setup phase uses context
information from each service provider and using this information, then data set
usage policies are generated. The data set usage policies are cast in the
framework of the common cloud ontology. The working phase consists of policy
management, interpretation, and validation. They propose a Usage
Management Cloud Service that interacts with individual cloud computing
systems to determine whether operations in the given contexts are permitted.
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Nandina et. al. leveraged this conceptual model and implemented a
hierarchical UM system for cloud computing (Nandina, et al., 2013). In this
system, a centralized Usage Management Manager (UMM) provides the user
authorization and access control decision functions. The UMM considers the
user's operating context in making access control decisions. The concept of
operations for the hierarchical cloud computing UM system is illustrated in Figure
4.

Figure 4 Usage Management in a Multi-Cloud Computing Environment

The hierarchical UM system provides the capability to control provisioning
of data to VMs. The provisioning is allowed if, and only if, the requesting user is
authorized to access the data in their current operating context and the target
virtual machine is configured with at least the protective measures that are
required for the type of information requested. The access decision implements
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the simple security property as well as enforces the policy that restrict the use of
sensitive information to cloud computing resources that have been configured to
use particular security measures.

The hierarchical cloud computing UM system operates in the follow sequence:
1

A user connects to the UMM.

2.

The UMM validates the user's credentials and desired operating context.

3.

Based on data in the authorization data base, the UMM presents the user
with a list of data sets that he or she is authorized to access.

4.

The user selects a data set.

5.

The UMM downloads both the data and a set of metadata, which we call the
license. The license describes the data set characteristics and includes
policy information on how the data may be used. One of the metadata fields
specifies the sensitivity level of the data, which in turn corresponds to
restrictions on sharing.

6.

Based on the license data, the UMM instantiates a VM that is configured with
protective measures that are appropriate for the data sensitivity and usage
restrictions.

7.

Ideally, once the data resides in the VM, a UM framework inside the VM
enforces usage restrictions.

This hierarchical implementation is similar to previous work in that once
data are transferred to a VM, there is no capability to actually enforce the usage
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management policies within it. Certain policies, such as time of use, can be
enforced by the UMM simply by shutting down the VM. Other policies, such as
prohibiting any copying, cannot be enforced within the VM with this system. In
order to enforce these types of policies, an enforcement mechanism must be
capable of monitoring sensitive data as they enter the VM and track their
movement as computation proceeds.
Given that the objective is to control the flow of information in the virtual
machine, we must consider all possible flow paths. One approach to consider is
using nested hypervisors. CloudVisor uses nested hypervisors. The SubVirt
effort demonstrates how a hypervisor can be inserted underneath a guest
operating system and can provide excellent control, with no modifications to the
application software or guest operating system.
Using the hypervisor for enforcement will require controls for every
interface to which data can be written to by the operating system. In addition,
each interface may pass a mix of data, some of which must be controlled. This
will require that the hypervisor-based enforcement mechanism is capable of
selectively restricting data transit. To address this issue, one next considers
research that is oriented toward instrumentation and monitoring information
flows.
4.3 Data Flow Tracking
To determine data flows, it is possible to analyze source code and
determine data flows, but that approach is logistically unfeasible. So, a means of
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instrumenting applications is needed. Ideally, this must be done with no
modifications to the application itself.
4.3.1 Pin
We can instrument application software using Pin and associated Pintools
(Luk, et al., 2005). Pin is a software system that provides the ability to
instrument application software by inserting extra code to observe its behavior.
Pintools are routines which communicate with Pin and implement instrumentation
and analysis functions. Pin has an extensive set of capabilities that can
instrument the unmodified application at multiple levels such as: instruction,
function, system call, thread, and image. It provides a capability to examine the
parameters passed to functions and the corresponding returned values. One very
important characteristic is that operations can be instrumented before they are
actually executed, or immediately after. This is essential because if data are
entering an application, the enforcement mechanism will require action
immediately after the input function executes in order to properly tag incoming
data. Similarly, when data are slated to exit an application, the enforcement
mechanism must be invoked before the actual operation takes place to prevent
prohibited actions.
4.3.2 libdft
Dynamic Data Flow Tracking (DFT) is generally used for taint analysis,
which is, tracking the flow of data from a network source as it propagates in a
processor. DFT research has yielded potential solutions that can be used for
usage management enforcement. Specifically, libdft provides a means of
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applying DFT to commodity software (Kemerlis, Portokalidis, Jee, & Keromytis,
2012). It uses Pin for instrumentation and analysis, and can provide the
information necessary to selectively control how data sets are used in an
application.
4.3.3 CloudFence
CloudFence is a system which uses DFT, specifically libdft, to audit the
use of cloud-resident data (Pappas, Kemerlisl, Zavou, Polychronakis, &
Keromytis, 2012). The system involves three parties: the cloud infrastructure
provider, a cloud web service provider, and users. The intent is that CloudFence
would be offered by the cloud providers to the service providers as a service; the
service providers integrate the data flow tracking functions into their services and
tag data that need to be protected. Then, the users can monitor the propagation
of their data. The authors also suggest that service providers could potentially
use the tagging information to control the flow of information after they specify
the sources of sensitive data and define which paths are allowed and which are
not. This would require some modification of the application software to interact
with the DFT capability.
DFT is a capability that can be used for UM enforcement. As suggested
by the CloudFence authors, if data of interest can be identified, then it is possible
to restrict flow paths. This research effort will demonstrate that data flows can be
monitored using DFT and by using licenses to identify which data are sensitive,
yield an automatic UM enforcement mechanism that can be used in VMs.
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Chapter 5 – Method
5.1 Test Environment
With cloud computing virtual machines, a large fraction of them use Linux
for the guest operating system. An attractive characteristic of Linux (and its
ancestor, Unix) is that all devices are treated as files, so moving data to and from
data files and I/O devices is done using a limited set of system calls. Both
software development and experiments were done on an Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 32bit operating system executing on an Intel T4200 Dual Core Pentium processor.
Instrumentation was done using the 2.13-62141-gcc.4.4.7-linux version of the
Intel PIN instrumentation code. For the Pintool, the research began with the
libdft-3.1415alpha Dynamic Flow Tracking software that was originally developed
for taint analysis and later modified for UM enforcement. All code was compiled
with gcc (Ubuntu 4.8.2-19ubuntu1) 4.8.2.
The PIN and modified libdft tools provide an operational configuration
similar to what is shown in Figure 5. An unmodified and unwitting application is
processed by the PIN engine and is then instrumented, analyzed, and potentially
controlled using functions in a Pintool. (libdft is a Pintool.) In the experiments,
the Pintool monitors individual instruction execution, system calls, file input and
output operations, and network related functions. This provides an ability to
monitor and control all input and output data flow operations of the unmodified
application. This capability will ultimately be used to enforce the usage
management policies within the processor.
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Figure 5 Enforcement Mechanism Configuration
5.2 Instrumentation
The Pin library is quite extensive in term of instrumentation capabilities. It
also includes the capability to log data and events for post execution analysis. In
order to verify proper operation of the libdft code after making a number of
modifications to: address compatibility issues, add additional tag propagation
capabilities, and extend the functionality for UM enforcement, extensive logging
capabilities were added to record tag propagation operations. The log files
generated during application software execution provide a way to examine, in
detail, the status of all operand tags as each assembly language instruction is
executed. An example of this instrumentation capability is shown in Figure 6. In
this example, lines 1-6 show a sequence of assembly language instructions that
are being executed. The instructions have been extracted using the Pin
INS_Disassemble() instrumentation function. Next, lines 7-12 illustrate the
corresponding tag propagation actions that are being performed by libdft using
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Pin instruction instrumentation functions. Using a search function in an editor
such as gedit, it is easy to quickly find operations of interest in the log files and
analyze the tag propagation behavior.

Figure 6 Detailed Tag Propagation Instrumentation

Depending on the size of the application size and the duration of operation, the
log files can be quite large. To make the log file size manageable, the detailed
logging capability can be disabled, as needed.
5.3 Test Configuration
UM enforcement requires the ability to monitor data entering an
application from multiple sources and controlling which, if any, devices may
receive data output from the application. To test the ability of the enhanced
Pintool, which is called libdft_um, a test application which inputs data from files,
the keyboard (stdin), and a network interface was used. As shown in Figure 7,
data entering on each interface may be tagged. As data are processed in the
instrumented application, tags are propagated, as appropriate, during the
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execution of each machine instruction. Eventually, the application executes an
output operation and then the libdft_um instrumentation checks the data for tags
and if necessary, prevents the output operation. For the experiments, alerts
were recorded in the log files and the writes of tagged data were allowed to
proceed.

Figure 7 DFT-Based Control
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5.4 Instrumentation Methodology and License Usage
The PIN system is capable of instrumenting functions either prior to
execution, or after. To implement a UM enforcement mechanism, we must use
both. For example, assuming that an application will read data from a file, we
can first verify that the data to be read has a valid license that specifies how the
information can be used. Similarly, if data are to be written to a file, we can first
check that the output file has a license that specifies its sensitivity parameters.
If an open() system call is instrumented immediately after execution, then the
assigned file descriptor is available. The enforcement mechanism can then
check for a corresponding license file. If the usage policy within the license
designates the information as sensitive, then the file descriptor can be added to
the set of “interesting inputs”. If the data file has no license, then in the spirit of
“fail-safe”, the data read can automatically be treated as high sensitivity.
Similarly, if an output file does not have an associated license, the output file is
assumed to be a low sensitivity level. With these default settings and the
dominance relationship enforcement, data will not be permitted to flow from a
source with no license to an output with no license. The enforcement
mechanism activities are illustrated in Figure 8 for a file which is to be read and
Figure 9 for a file to which data are to be written into.

38

open() system call for read detected

Determine if
License Exists

No License Available

Load corresponding license

Data Sensitive
Determine Data
Sensitivity

Data Not Sensitive

No Data Tagging

Tag Data From This File

Figure 8 License check activities when open() is called for read operations

open() system call for write or append detected

No License Available

Determine if
License Exists

License Available

Load corresponding license

Low Sensitivity Data
Set Output File
Data Sensitivity
High Sensitivity Data

Set File to High Sensitivity

Set File to Low Sensitivity

Figure 9 License check activities when open() is called for write operations
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To enforce the data flow policies when the source and destination file
licenses are provided, the enforcement mechanism checks the dominance
relationship between the data and the destination and, if necessary, the
enforcement mechanism can prevent the operation from proceeding. Continuing
with the example in more detail, assume that the application is reading data from
a file which is designated as high sensitivity. With the read() system call,
instrumenting the function after it has been executed is more useful because the
return value indicates how many bytes have actually been read, enabling the
instrumentation to tag the appropriate number of tag bits. When a write()
operation is to be executed, the instrumentation must check if the data to be
written are tagged before the write function is actually executed. If the data are
tagged, then the instrumentation function can prevent the write from proceeding.
This sequence of operations is shown below in Figure 10.
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Enforcement Mechanism

Application

Open Files for Read and Write
Verfiy Licenses
Exist & Determine
Senstivity Levels

Application
Initialization
Open Files

Licenses Read

Data in Buffer
Tag Input
Data, If
Necessary

Read Data
Files

Data Tagged, if REQD

Process Data
System Call to write() Function
Examine Tags
& dest licenses
to permit Op

Function allowed or denied
Output Data
or Halt

Figure 10 Enforcement Sequence

While Figure 10 refers to data files, similar operations can take place
when the sources or destinations for data flows are network sockets. The
individual connections must either have licenses that specify the associated
sensitivity levels, or as in case of the data files, default sensitivity levels will be
assumed. Again, a restrictive strategy will be used to prevent undesired data
flows.
5.5 License Implementation
The enforcement mechanism must operate automatically to be useful.
This requires that the enforcement mechanism must be capable of not only
locating a license file, but it must also have the capability to open the file and
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parse the contents to examine a specific term which specifies the data sensitivity.
A typical license may use an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) variant to
specify policy items. An example policy license is shown below in Figure 11 .

Figure 11 Typical XML-Based Policy License

In order to provide the automatic operation capability, the Libxml2 XML C
parser and toolkit developed for the Gnome project were incorporated into the
Pintool (Veilard, 2014). For data files, corresponding licenses were used to
designate the data as sensitive, or non-sensitive. As shown in the example, the
license files also contain other usage policy information that could be used by a
centralized UMM to control data access by the VM.
5.6 Assessing Performance
The UM enforcement mechanism will increase the execution time of any
application. The Pin instrumentation and DFT functionality must first be
initialized, which includes processing the application code itself. Then as the
application code is executing, the instrumentation monitors all operations
including assembly language instructions and system calls. For assembly
language instructions that process data, additional code for tag propagation is
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also executed. For system calls associated with data input and output, license
processing, tag setting, and tag condition monitoring are also performed.
Because of the extensive operations performed by Pin and libdft-um, an increase
in execution time is to be expected.
To get a clearer sense of the additional computational burden, testing was
done with an application that reads the contents of an image file, in JPEG format,
and writes it to another file. License files for both the input and output files were
included, with the input designated as sensitive and the output designated as
non-sensitive, to verify that the tag propagation and detection logic was
functioning properly. The test application was run using image files of varying
sizes and the execution time was measured while running in both instrumented
and non-instrumented modes. The tests were executed in a typical Linux
environment, where the operating system is executing multiple processes.
However, no other user applications were executing during these tests. The
tests were repeated several times, and because of multi-tasking, the execution
times show some variability.
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Chapter 6 - Results and Discussion
The complexity of the Pin and Pintool software led to the need for a
capability to be able to examine execution data in detail after conducting an
experiment. Detailed log files provide a way to verify that the tag-related
operations are functioning properly and a way to record experiment results. A
log file provides a time history of execution, which can then be traversed in a
forward or backward direction, making it more effective than a run-time
debugger.

After conducting the initial experiments to verify that the data tags

were being set and propagated correctly, subsequent experiments were
conducted using a minimized logging mode.
The capability of using a mix of sensitive and non-sensitive data sources,
was demonstrated using a test program in which the data input by the user via
stdin (the keyboard) were non-sensitive and data read from both a data file and a
network socket were considered sensitive. The stdout display, the output data
file, and the network socket connections were all designated as non-sensitive, so
if any sensitive data was to be written to these devices, the logging function
would generate an alert. Information generated by the application as output to
stdout for user prompts was considered as non-sensitive, as well.
Appendix A provides a set of data that was generated using this test
program, which demonstrates the implemented UM enforcement mechanism
properly tracking sensitive data interleaved with non-sensitive data. The UM
enforcement mechanism was able to detect when sensitive data was being
output and discriminate between sensitive and non-sensitive data. To
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emphasize, for these tagging validation experiments, the sensitive sources were
selected prior to application execution.
These tagging validation experiments included user inputs and outputs
(stdin and stdout), files, and network interfaces (sockets). Similar capabilities will
be needed to enforce flows in inter-process communication channels, such as
pipes and shared memory; they are not implemented in this research effort.
The next set of experiments used xml license files to designate usage
policies and sensitivity levels of the data files. After augmenting the UM
enforcement mechanism software to include the license interpretation
capabilities, subsequent testing was done using the same test program as
before. Now each data file can have an associated license file of the form shown
in Figure 11. As shown in Appendix B, the user dialog for this test program is
identical to that of the previous set of experiments, but now the instrumentation
software that implements the UM enforcement mechanism does more than just
tag data and track the tag propagation.
As part of the UM enforcement process, after a data file is opened and
assigned a file designator by the operating system, the instrumentation software
opens an associated license file that is stored in same location. The
instrumentation software parses the license and if the data are designated as
sensitive, then the data will be tagged after any read from the file. If no license is
available, a default designation of sensitive is applied to the file.
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The license validation tests are significant because they demonstrate that
an enforcement mechanism can automatically be selectively activated by using a
license. Also very significant is the fact that the enforcement mechanism can
control an application’s ability to output data with no modification necessary.
Because the write() system calls are instrumented before the system call are
actually executed, the instrumentation software can prevent a write operation
from actually taking place. To prevent a write operation, the Pin instrumentation
can insert instructions to force an immediate return from the system call, allowing
the application software to continue executing. Because the intent of this
research effort is to demonstrate feasibility, the current enforcement mechanism
response to writes is limited to logging prohibited actions.
The implementation strategies are illustrated in the code segments shown
in Appendix C. These segments illustrate the high level instrumentation details
that provide the automatic enforcement capability obtained by combining the DFT
capability with machine readable licenses. The enforcement capability is
possible because of the ability to instrument system calls either prior to or just
after execution.
6.1 Performance Impact
With the tag propagation and license processing operation verified, the
next question to address was: “what is the actual processing burden imposed by
the enforcement mechanism?” To minimize the effects of communication delays
and user interaction, the UM enforcement mechanism was tested using an
application that copies data from one file source and writes it to another file
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destination. With this test application, none of the file data are copied to stdout.
Multiple experiments were conducted using various size files. The timing results
are shown below in Table 1 .

Input File Size
1

9.2kB

Non-Instrumented
Execution time nS
499088

Instrumented
Execution time nS
519161522

2

9.2kB

339202

516847624

1

10 x 9.2kB

2615393

549511587

2

10 x 9.2kB

2580500

562787186

1

2.6MB

14270359

545390960

2

2.6MB

13440185

561819342

1

10 x 2.6MB

118059117

701829666

2

10 x 2.6MB

118275120

680895333

Table 1 - Measured Execution Times

Each timing experiment was conducted twice to illustrate the variation that
is experienced because of execution scheduling by the operating system. This is
typical of any multi-process environment. The next thing to note is that there is a
fixed amount of time that is used to initialize the Pin instrumentation, as it preprocesses the application executable to provide the run-time monitoring
capability. The Pintool, or libdft-um, must also be initialized, which adds to the
initialization time.
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As seen below in Figure 12, the execution time grows linearly, as a
function of the quantity of data transferred, in both the instrument and noninstrumented application tests. This test program did not have any data input
from stdin (the user) or from a network interface nor was there was any output to
stdout or to a network interface. As a result, there were no input or output delays
that would increase the execution time, so the test program does give reasonable
insight into the delays introduced by the instrumentation programs used to
implement the enforcement mechanism.
800,000,000
700,000,000

Execution Time nSec

600,000,000
500,000,000

Non_Instr Ex Time

400,000,000

Instr Ex Time

300,000,000

Linear (Non_Instr Ex
Time)
Linear (Instr Ex Time)

200,000,000
100,000,000
0
0.0E+00

1.0E+07
2.0E+07
3.0E+07
Number of Bytes Transferred

Figure 12 - Timing Comparison Test Results

In evaluating the timing test results, it must be emphasized that a UM
enforcement mechanism would only be used in VMs that are intended to process
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either a mix of sensitive and non-sensitive data. Again, the purpose is to restrict
what a user can do with data once he or she has been granted legitimate access.
In this situation, the performance penalty associated with initialization would be
acceptable.
Keeping in mind that the UM enforcement mechanism is only intended for
use in limited situations, one might consider an implementation of where the
information owner instantiates a VM with an appropriately configured image of
the guest operating system and application software. (This is an example of the
IaaS service model.) The operator could then start execution of UM enforced
applications, with which the users would then interact. From the user
perspective, this would be the Software as a Service (SaaS) model of operation,
which is typical of users’ everyday interactions with commercial cloud-based
services.
6.2 Thoroughness of Tag Testing
Output functions often aggregate data incrementally in an output buffer,
before an actual write to the device takes place. To deal with a situation of
where the stream of data into a buffer has sensitive data interleaved with nonsensitive data, the enforcement mechanism examines the entire contents of the
buffer to verify that all the data is non-sensitive before the actual write takes
place. This approach prevents inserting sensitive data in the middle of a stream
of non-sensitive data.
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6.3 Implicit Data Flows
A last issue to address is that of implicit data flows. In many applications,
data are read in, modified using arithmetic or logic operations, and then modified
data are written out. This type of flow is common, but one cannot assume that
only explicit data flows are of interest when implementing a UM enforcement
capability.
In the early stages of trying to apply the DFT software for UM
enforcement, a number of experiments resulted in situations where data tags did
not propagate as expected. This provided some of the motivation to add the
comprehensive logging capability for detailed analysis. The analysis brought to
light the need for some software changes to extend the tag propagation
capabilities for UM. Yet, there were still cases where tags were not propagating
as expected. Further detailed analysis of the assembly language instruction
instrumentation log data revealed that in the application, some library data format
conversion routines use conditional branching, based on input data values, to
generate equivalent values. The specific case where this implicit flow was found
was in the conversion process between integer values to an equivalent ASCII
string that was to be written to a data file. This discovery leads one to conclude
that a strategy of propagating tags at the assembly language instruction level
only, may not be adequate to track implicit data flows.
As stated earlier, one of the goals of this research is to be able to control
how data are used by application software without the need for modifications to
the source code. Application source code can be analyzed to identify and track
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all data flows, but this may not be feasible, nor desirable. Also, almost all
applications use standard library functions for many purposes. So even if the
application source code does not contain implicit data flows in the design, there
is a possibility that the library functions do contain such flows, as this research
experience has shown.
The dynamic instrumentation capability obtained by using Pin provides a
means of monitoring all instructions of the application source code and
associated library functions. Enhancing the Pin-based UM enforcement
mechanism to detect implicit data flows will provide a more comprehensive
capability.
To detect the implicit data flows, tag propagation might be done at a
higher level, such as at the function level. (Fenton, 1974) described an abstract
Data Mark Machine to study implicit data flows and proposed tagging the
program counter to convert implicit data flows to explicit data flows. The
theoretical approach was based on a modified Minsky machine. In the approach,
two objectives are to ensure that a non-sensitive execution path is not dependent
on sensitive information and when operating in a sensitive execution path, to
ensure that no non-sensitive registers can be changed. While the specific
analysis approach is not directly applicable, insights gleaned from this work may
guide an implementation strategy.
Conceptually, one could consider enhancing the UM enforcement
mechanism in a similar manner. This could be done by adding tag propagation
logic where, if any data passed into a routine is sensitive, then output data is also
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considered sensitive and tagged accordingly. This logic could be invoked when
detecting a call instruction. If any of the parameters passed to the routine are
tagged, then when the ret instruction is detected, registers used to return
parameters or memory pointers would also be tagged. Suffice it to say; adding
an ability to track implicit flows will make this demonstrated UM enforcement
mechanism more effective.
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Conclusions
The results of this research show that while using a completely softwarebased approach, it is possible to automatically enforce usage management within
a processor environment. The enforcement mechanism can use data flow
tracking to monitor data flows within an unmodified application and identify and
prevent unwanted flows to a variety of destinations. Thus, the enforcement
mechanism can control which actions the user is allowed to execute for a specific
set of data. Because the approach does not require direct access to any
hardware, it can be used effectively in a virtual machine, and by extension, in a
cloud computing environment that provides resources using the Infrastructure as
a Service operating model.
Automatic operation of the enforcement mechanism requires machine
readable licenses for every data set to be controlled. The licenses must specify
usage policies and in the absence of a license, there must be a default policy
specified. This research effort has demonstrated an enforcement mechanism
capable of using license-specified policies to identify information that must be
controlled.
The enforcement mechanism does impose a performance penalty.
Experimental results show that there are two components, one a fixed delay
associated with the initialization process, and a second component that grows
linearly with the size of the data sets to be processed, similar to the unmodified
application. Thus, an enforcement mechanism should not present an undue
processing burden.
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Ideally, this usage management enforcement mechanism capability can
be used with any unmodified application software. There should be no need to
analyze the application software and the associated libraries, as all explicit data
flows will be detected automatically. However, there is no way to ensure that the
software developers do not use data conversion algorithms that contain implicit
data flows. Therefore, for greater assurance that the enforcement mechanism
does not allow users to use data in a prohibited manner, this enforcement
mechanism capability should be extended to detect implicit data flows.
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Appendix A - Tagging Validation Experiments
This appendix contains test results of experimentation that was done to
verify the proper operation of the tag setting, propagation, and detection
capabilities of the UM enforcement mechanism. In this experiment, the system
was configured to read from: a data file, a network socket operating as a server,
and the keyboard (stdin). A second process was executing a client program that
provided the input data for the server. After outputting a set of user prompts, the
application program read one line of data from the specified input source. Only
the data input from the network socket and data file were tagged. The dialog
between the application and the user via stdin and stdout (file descriptors 0 and
1, respectively) is shown below. Note: For brevity, The dialog associated with
the user prompts is omitted after the first instance.
ejnava@ejnava-HP-G60-Notebook-PC:~/libdft/libdft_linux-i386/tools$ sudo
/usr/src/pin/pin -follow-execv -t libdft-um.so -s 0 -- ./file_io5c
-----------------------------------Select which input source to use:
1 - keyboard
2 - data file
3 - network
4 - Quit
-1
input data:
here is an input from the keyboard
here is an input from the keyboard
------------------------------------2
this is a file with test data used for experimenting with system calls.
------------------------------------1
input data:
here is another input from the keyboard
here is another input from the keyboard
------------------------------------3
waiting for network data
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Received packet from 127.0.0.1:52330
Data: Here is a message from a client to the server
------------------------------------3
waiting for network data
Received packet from 127.0.0.1:52330
Data: Here is another message from the client to the server
------------------------------------2
It contains multiple lines that will be read in an interleaved fashion
------------------------------------4

All data that are input from: stdin, the data file, and the network interface, are
written to an output file. For this experiment, no writes are prohibited, but the tag
status of all data written to any interface is logged in the log file. When data are
input on stdin, they are echoed back to stdout. When a line of data is read from
a data file, the line is written to stdout and to the output file. When a line of data
is received on the network interface, the data are written to stdout, to the output
file, and are also echoed back to the client through the network interface.
Shown below are excerpts from the log file generated during execution of
the experimental application code with the full logging capability enabled. Not
shown are instruction disassembly and tag propagation logging. Also not shown
are the repetitive instances of log entries associated with the output of the
options menu and input prompt sent to stdout for each input sequence. The log
operations are triggered by instrumentation when the application is making a
system call. Each system call type has a unique integer identifier. For the
system calls shown in the log file below, the integer identifiers are given in Table
2.
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Syscall Number
Description
3
sys_read
4
sys_write
5
sys_open
6
sys_close
33
sys_access
45
sys_brk
91
sys_munmap
102
sys_socketcall
125
sys_mprotect
192
sys_mmap_pgoff
197
sys_fstat64
243
sys_set_thread_area
252
sys_exit_group
Table 2 Select System Call Numbers
For the sys_socketcall, a specific function requested is specified using an integer
function number as part of the system call. As one system call is used for all
socket functions, it necessary to also record the function number for analysis.
The Socketcall function numbers used in the logfile excerpt below are shown in
Table 3.

Socketcall Function
Description
Number
1
sys_socket
2
sys_bind
11
sys_sendto
12
sys_recvfrom
Table 3 Select Socketcall Function Numbers

The excerpts from the logfile are shown below. The number on the left is the line
number of the original logfile. On each line is information that has been logged
by the enforcement mechanism software. Note that what is shown has been

57

generated with the full instrumentation capability enabled. For normal operation,
the logging is not as extensive.
--- Excerpts from pintool.log of Experiment on Oct 23,2014
63834 ++ syscall: 102
63838 -------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 1
63836 -------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 1
63837
Adding socket descriptor fn: 4 to monitored set
65637 ++ syscall: 102
65638 -------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 2
65639 -------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 2
107538
107539
108154
108155
109710
109711
109712
Size: 1
109713
109714

++ syscall: 5
..... post_open_hook - fn: 5
++ syscall: 5
..... post_open_hook - fn: 6
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:2

--------- Start of User Prompts Logging ----------111338
111339
111340
Size: 37
111341
111342
111703
111704
111705
Size: 35
111706
111707
111991
111992
111993
Size: 14
111994
111995
112263

++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:38
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:36
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:15
++ syscall: 4
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112264
112265
Size: 15
112266
112267
112509
112510
112511
Size: 13
112512
112513
113437
113438
113439
Size: 10
113440
113441
114459
114460
114461
Size: 1
114462
114463

.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:16
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:14
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:11
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:2

--------- End of User Prompts Logging ----------114618
114619
114620
114621

++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:2

114959
114960
114961
Size: 13
114962
114963
115623
115624
115625
115626
118180
118181
118182
35
118183
118184

++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:14
++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:35

++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:36
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....
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121262`++ syscall: 3
121263
......post_read_hook fn: 0
121264
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
121265
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:2
122067
122068
122069
122070
122071

++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 5
.....post_read_hook: tagmap_setn addr: 95942000 size: 402
........Entering tagmap_setn - address:95942000 size:402
***** Tagged data verified

122616`++ syscall: 4
122617
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
122618
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
Size: 72
122619
***** Tagged data being written at Address 95988000 Size: 72
122620
********* ALERT!! ***********
122621
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
122622
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:73
123142
123143
123144
Size: 1
123145
123146
126224
126225
126226
126227
126481
126482
126483
Size: 13
126484
126485
126683
126684
126685
126686
127542
127543
127544
Size: 40
127545

++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:2
++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:2
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:14
++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:40
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
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127546
....
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130624
130625
130626
130627
130891
130892
130893
Size: 25
130894
130895
131960
131961
131962
131963
131964
135843
135844
135845
Size: 37
135846
135847
136251
136252
136253
Size: 52
136254
136255
136256
136257
136830
136831
136832
136833
Size: 46
136834
136835
137216
137217
137218
Size: 1
137219
137220

Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:41

++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:2
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:26
++ syscall: 102
-------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 12
-------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 12
SYS_RECVFROM - tagmap_setn
........Entering tagmap_setn - address:bf94b68c size:46
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:38
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
***** Tagged data being written at Address 95988000 Size: 52
********* ALERT!! ***********
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:53
++ syscall: 102
-------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 11
SYS_SENDTO - Buffer: bf94b68c size: 46
***** Tagged data being written at Address bf94b68c
********* ALERT!! ***********
-------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 11
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:2
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140298
140299
140300
140301
140563
140564
140565
Size: 25
140566
140567
140685
140686
140687
140688
140689
142586
142587
142588
Size: 37
142589
142590
142990
142991
142992
Size: 60
142993
142994
142995
142996
143136
143137
143138
143139
Size: 54
143140
143141
143509
143510
143511
Size: 1
143512
143513

++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:2
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:26
++ syscall: 102
-------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 12
-------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 12
SYS_RECVFROM - tagmap_setn
........Entering tagmap_setn - address:bf94b68c size:54
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:38
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
***** Tagged data being written at Address 95988000 Size: 60
********* ALERT!! ***********
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:61
++ syscall: 102
-------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 11
SYS_SENDTO - Buffer: bf94b68c size: 54
***** Tagged data being written at Address bf94b68c
********* ALERT!! ***********
-------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 11
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:2
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146591
146592
146593
146594
147175
147176
147177
Size: 71
147178
147179
147180
147181
147680
147681
147682
Size: 1
147683
147684
....

++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:2
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
***** Tagged data being written at Address 95988000 Size: 71
********* ALERT!! ***********
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:72
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95988000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95988000 size:2

User prompts logging

150762
150763
150764
150765

++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95967000 size:2

151257
151258

++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 4

152021
152022

++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 5

153079
153080
153081
Size: 318
153082
153083
153084
153085
153152
153153

++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 6
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95953000
***** Tagged data being written at Address 95953000 Size: 318
********* ALERT!! ***********
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 6
Entering tagmap_clrn - address:95953000 size:319
++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 6

A detailed explanation of the results follows:
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•

Lines 63834 – 63837 are logging the creation of the socket that is used for
network communication. The socket is assigned file descriptor 4.

•

Lines 65637 – 65639 are logging the action of binding a local address to
the socket.

•

Lines 107538 – 107539 are logging the opening of a data file to be read.
This file is assigned file descriptor 5.

•

Lines 108154 – 108155 are logging the opening a file to which data are to
be written. It is assigned file descriptor 6.

•

Lines 109710 – 109714 are logging the writing of a program generated
character, Newline, to stdout (file descriptor 1, by default). The character
is not tagged, as it does not come from a sensitive source.

•

Lines 111338 – 111342, 111703 – 111707, 111991 – 111995, 112263 –
112267, 112509 – 112513, 113437 – 113441, and 114459 – 114463 are
the logging associated with writing the options menu and input prompt to
stdout. These are generated by the application and the data are not
tagged. This sequence repeats and is not shown in the rest of the
application dialog or log data under discussion.

•

Lines 114618 – 114621 are logging the data that is input to stdin (file
descriptor 0, by default). This is the input from the user which selects
which data source to read. For this experiment, data input into stdin is not
marked as sensitive, so it is not tagged.

•

Lines 114959 – 114963 are logging the data written to stdout to prompt
the user to input data after having selected option 1.
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•

Lines 115623 – 115626 are logging the application reading data from stdin
that the user is inputting. This line of data will later be written to an output
file. Because in this experiment, stdin is not considered a sensitive
source, the data are not tagged.

•

Lines 118180 – 118184 are logging of the application software writing of
the data, which was input by the user into stdin, back out to stdout. Note
that in the user dialog, there are two copies of the data input by the user
because the operating system echoes back what is typed in, as well.
Before the data are written to stdout, they are checked to see if any of the
data are tagged. None are, so there is no alert.

•

Lines 121262 – 121265 are logging the data input to stdin by the user to
select the next input source. This input is not tagged.

•

Lines 122067 – 122071 are logging the reading from the data file which
has been designated as a sensitive source. This file, which has file
descriptor 5 as its identification, is read as one large block by the
operating system for efficiency. As shown, the data are tagged.

•

Lines 122616 – 122622 are logging the writing of the first line of data read
from fd:5 to stdout. As always, all data are checked for tags before the
write is executed, and the enforcement mechanism detects the presence
of tagged data and generates an alert.

•

Lines 123142 – 123146 are logging the writing of the user prompt
character to stdout. As before, the application generated data are not
tagged.
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•

Lines 126624 – 126627 are logging the data input to stdin by the user to
select the next input source. Again this input is not tagged.

•

Lines 126481 – 126485 are logging the data written to stdout to prompt
the user to input data after having selected option 1.

•

Lines 126683 – 126686 are logging the application reading data from
stdin. The data are not tagged.

•

Lines 127542 – 127546 are logging the application writing data that were
just read into stdin back out to stdout. There are two copies of the data on
the application dialog because of the echo action described above. The
data are not tagged because the source is stdin.

•

Lines 130624 – 130627 are logging the user input into stdin that selects
the next data input source. The input is not tagged.

•

Lines 130891 – 130893 are logging the application writing the message
“waiting for network data” to stdout. This is internally generated and is not
tagged.

•

Lines 131960 – 131964 are logging the input of data from the network
interface. For the experiment, the network interface is configured as a
source of sensitive information. All received data are tagged.

•

Lines 135843 – 135847 are logging a message generated by the
application that reports receipt of a network message from
ip_address:port_no. The message does not include any of the input data
so the data written to stdout are not tagged.
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•

Lines 136251 – 136257 are logging the write of data received from the
network interface out to stdout. As the data are from a sensitive source,
the data are checked for tags. Tagged data are detected and an alert is
issued.

•

Lines 136830 – 136835 are logging the writing of data, which was
previously read from the network interface, back out to the network
interface to the remote client. The data are checked for tags, which are
detected, and an alert is issued accordingly.

•

Lines 137216 – 143141 log a repeat of the sequence of a user selecting
the network interface, receipt of data from the network interface, and retransmission of that data to stdout and to the network interface with the
same alert notifications as before.

•

Lines 143509 – 147181 log a repeat of the sequence of a user selecting
the data file for input (which is considered sensitive) and writing the data
back out to stdout.

•

Lines 147680 – 147684 log the application generating a blank line and
user prompt to stdout. The data are not tagged.

•

Lines 150762 – 150765 log the user inputting a quit command from stdin.
The input is not sensitive, so data are not tagged.

•

Lines 151257 – 151258 and lines 152021 – 152022 log the close
operation for the network connection and for the input data file.
It is important to note that all data that is being input to the application is
being written to the output file referenced by fd:6. Up to this point no
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write() system calls have been executed for this fd. The reason is that
data are being copied to a buffer. Up to this point, no data in the buffer
have been written to the file.
•

Lines 153079 – 153085 are logging the application write of data to the
output file with fd:6. The data include a mix of tagged and untagged data.
Each byte in the buffer with valid data to be written is tested for tags. If
any of these byes are tagged, then an alert is issued.

•

Lines 153152 – 153153 are logging the closing of the output file.

As shown by these experimental results, the enforcement mechanism can
accurately track explicit flows of data from sensitive sources to all outputs. The
mechanism effectively discriminates between non-sensitive and sensitive data.
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Appendix B – License Parsing Validation Experiments
The purpose of the next set of experiments was to demonstrate the
correct parsing of license files associated with the data files, and to demonstrate
that the enforcement mechanism could tag data based on the license file
contents. The UM enforcement mechanism is completely independent of the
application, so this set of experiments used the same multi-input source, multioutput destination test application as was used for the tag propagation validation
experiments summarized in Appendix A.
The experiments were intended to demonstrate the proper use of licenses
to determine the sensitivity of data contained in data files. The user dialog in the
case of a test application reading a data file proceeds as follows:
ejnava@ejnava-HP-G60-Notebook-PC:~/libdft/libdft_linux-i386/tools$ sudo
/usr/src/pin/pin -follow-execv -t libdft-um.so -s 0 -- ./file_io5c
-----------------------------------Select which input source to use:
1 - keyboard
2 - data file
3 - network
4 - Quit
-2
this is a file with test data used for experimenting with system calls.
-----------------------------------Select which input source to use:
1 - keyboard
2 - data file
3 - network
4 - Quit
-4

In this case, the user selects a data file input source and the first line is read and
output to the terminal (stdout). Next, the user terminates the application by
selecting the option 4. To illustrate the details of the operations that are taking
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place and are monitored by the enforcement management mechanism, the entire
logfile contents are given below. (Note that the detailed logging functionality has
been turned off, resulting in a considerably smaller log file.)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Pin 2.13 kit 62139
tagmap allocated - address:95dbf000 size:536870912
- Invalid base and index registers
++ syscall: 45
++ syscall: 33
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 33
++ syscall: 5
++ syscall: 197
......sysexit_save call to tagmap_clrn
+++++++++ sys call id: 197 addr: bf9a0eb0 size: 96
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 4
++ syscall: 33
++ syscall: 5
++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 4
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
.....post_read_hook: tagmap_clrn addr: bf9a1000 size: 512
++ syscall: 197
......sysexit_save call to tagmap_clrn
+++++++++ sys call id: 197 addr: bf9a0f20 size: 96
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 4
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 243
++ syscall: 125
++ syscall: 125
++ syscall: 125
++ syscall: 91
++ syscall: 102
-------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 1
-------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 1
Adding socket descriptor fn: 4 to monitored set
++ syscall: 102
-------- pre_socketcall_hook - function no: 2
-------- post_socketcall_hook - function no: 2
++ syscall: 45
++ syscall: 45
++ syscall: 5
..... post_open_hook - fn: 5
......opened filename: test_data.txt
.......examining license file: test_data.txt.lic
.......file - test_data.txt.lic - is sensitive
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49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

++ syscall: 5
..... post_open_hook - fn: 6
......opened filename: test_data2.txt
.......examining license file: test_data2.txt.lic
.......file - test_data2.txt.lic - is not sensitive
++ syscall: 197
......sysexit_save call to tagmap_clrn
+++++++++ sys call id: 197 addr: bf9a1280 size: 96
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 1
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 37
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 35
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 14
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 15
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 13
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 10
++ syscall: 197
......sysexit_save call to tagmap_clrn
+++++++++ sys call id: 197 addr: bf9a1280 size: 96
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 1
++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
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Size: 1

Size: 37

Size: 35

Size: 14

Size: 15

Size: 13

Size: 10

Size: 1

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
.....post_read_hook: tagmap_clrn addr: 957f8000 size: 2
++ syscall: 197
......sysexit_save call to tagmap_clrn
+++++++++ sys call id: 197 addr: bf9a11f0 size: 96
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 5
.....post_read_hook: tagmap_setn addr: 957ec000 size: 402
***** Tagged data verified
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
***** Tagged data being written at Address 95817000 Size: 72
********* ALERT!! ***********
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 72
++ syscall: 197
......sysexit_save call to tagmap_clrn
+++++++++ sys call id: 197 addr: bf9a1280 size: 96
++ syscall: 192
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 1
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 37
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 35
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 14
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 15
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 13
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size:
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
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72

1

37

35

14

15

13

10

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 10
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 1
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95817000 Size: 1
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 1
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95817000 size: 1
++ syscall: 3
......post_read_hook fn: 0
post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags
.....post_read_hook: tagmap_clrn addr: 957f8000 size: 2
++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 4
++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 5
++ syscall: 91
++ syscall: 4
.........entering pre_write_hook fn: 6
---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: 95780000 Size: 72
***** Tagged data being written at Address 95780000 Size: 72
********* ALERT!! ***********
.........entering post_write_hook fn: 6
post_write_hook: tagmap_clrn address: 95780000 size: 72
++ syscall: 6
--------- post_close_hook: 6
++ syscall: 91
++ syscall: 252

While this logfile resembles the one shown in Appendix A, this one has
entries that were omitted from the previous example to focus on the tagging
activities. All entries are included here for a more comprehensive view.
•

The first two lines are associated with the initialization of Pin and libdft-um
Pintool. Line 2 logs the allocation of memory for the tagmap that is used
to track the tag status of the remaining virtual machine address space.

•

Lines 4 through 34 are documenting system calls that are used by the
operating system to allocate resources and start the execution of the
application.

73

•

Lines 35 -41 are associated with the creation of a network socket and
binding of the socket to a local address. The network socket has been
assigned the file designator – 4.

•

Lines 42 and 43 are related to the dynamic memory allocation process
that is moving the heap break point.

•

Line 45 is one of the more important events in this experiment, as it
indicates that a data file has been opened and has been assigned the file
designator – 5.

•

Line 46 indicates that the file name was passed to the enforcement
mechanism, which will then be used to identify the associated license file.

•

Line 47 indicates that an associated license file has been opened and is
being parsed.

•

Line 48 indicates that in the license file, the sensitivity_level parameter
specifies that the data are classified as sensitive. As a result, any data
read from the file will be tagged.

•

Lines 49 – 53 show a similar open process for the file test_data2.txt. In
this case, the file designator is 6, and the license specifies that data in the
file are non-sensitive.

•

Lines 54 – 57 are operating system operations associated with checking
file status and memory management.

•

Lines 58 – 105 represent the actions that are associated with presenting
the user the option table, which is shown in the above user dialog, and the
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user selecting an input option. (This is the same as what was shown
previously in Appendix A.)
•

Lines 106 – 109 are operating system operations associated with
checking file status and memory management.

•

Lines 110 – 113 show that data are being read from the input file, which
has already been designated as sensitive, and that the data tagging has
been verified. For efficiency, the operating system has read in more data
than what was requested in the application source code and all data are
contained in the data buffer at address 0x957ec000.

•

Lines 114 – 120 show that one line of the data read in from the sensitive
data file are being written out to stdout (file descriptor 1). Writes to stdout
are done immediately, rather than buffering outputs as is done with block
devices, such as disk data files. In file read operation, 402 bytes were
input. To write the first line to stdout, only 72 bytes were transferred back
out. Before the data are actually output, the associated tags are checked
and as shown, the enforcement mechanism has correctly detected a write
to a non-sensitive output.

•

Lines 121 – 124 are operating system operations associated with
checking file status and memory management.

•

Lines 125 – 168 again show the operations associated with presenting the
user with input options and the user selecting an input source. In this
case, the user selects the Quit option.

•

Lines 169-173 show the closing of the network socket and input file.
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•

Lines 174 – 180 show the one line that has been read in from file 1 now
being written out to file 2. The write is delayed as the operating system
will combine a sequence of writes operation into one for block type
devices, such as disk files. As only one line is to be written, it is
performed now. The enforcement mechanism checks the data and detects
that tagged data are being written and generates an alert.

•

Lines 181 – 182 show that the second data is being closed.

•

Lines 183-184 show the termination of the process.

These results demonstrates that with an ability to parse the contents of a license
file that specifies the usage policies, the usage management enforcement
mechanism can automatically determine which data sources are considered
sensitive and can tag and track the flows of data from those sources as they
propagate through an unmodified application.
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Appendix C – Enforcement Mechanism Software Excerpts
The Usage Management (UM) enforcement mechanism software
developed in this research is based on the Pin instrumentation software and the
libdft software developed for taint analysis (Luk, et al., 2005) (Kemerlis,
Portokalidis, Jee, & Keromytis, 2012). This appendix describes the major
components of the enforcement mechanism software and illustrates how the
collection of software components performs instrumentation, data flow tracking
(DFT), license parsing, and usage management enforcement.
The software consists of a number of major components or modules. The
first component is Pin, which is a software instrumentation tool developed by Intel
that supports multiple operating systems and processor architectures. Pin
provides the essential capabilities needed to monitor application execution in
order to enforce how data are used. The instrumentation capabilities are
selectively applied and controlled by a program that is called a Pintool.
The main module that initiates the data flow tracking and UM enforcement
is a c module called libdft-um.c. This module, which is described in more detail
below, initiates the Pin instrumentation, includes specific system call actions,
processes usage policy licenses, and monitors attempts to output sensitive data.
The module libdft_api.c contains the DFT initialization code that directs
Pin to instrument every assembly language instruction using the
TRACE_AddInstrumentFunction(). It also includes capabilities to track multiple
threads and store data when system calls are entered or exited. This module
also includes integer mappings for the 8, 16, and 32 bit register references.
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The module tagmap.c contains all of the code which: allocates tag
memory for monitoring the entire 4MB processor address space, sets tags,
retrieves tags, clears tags, and tests if tags are set for individual memory
addresses or for blocks of addresses. The tagging software uses one bit to store
a tag for each byte of memory space, so every operation requires a mapping
from the byte(s) address of interest to the corresponding bit(s) in the tag map.
The module syscall.c contains a table describing system call
characteristics including: number of arguments, the flag specifying if arguments
should be saved on entry, the flag specifying if return values should be saved, an
arguments map, the pre-syscall routine to be executed, and the post-syscall
routine to be executed. In addition, the module contains some syscall
instrumentation routines, some of which are redundant and are not used.
The module libdft_core.c includes the function ins_inspect() in which every
assembly language instruction is evaluated and when appropriate, propagates
the tags. For example, if the instruction is an ADD and one operand is tagged
while the second is not, the sum must be tagged; the tag is propagated to the
sum. The module contains a number of functions to deal with the variety of
operand types and addressing modes. The module must consider every
instruction for a potential flow of tagged data, so it is quite large. (The module
currently does not process any floating point instructions.)
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libdft-um
To illustrate the UM enforcement mechanism software operation, key
components of the libdft-um.c module are described below.
/*
* libdft-um
*
* a tool for enforcing usage management by monitoring all
* data flows from sources identified as sensitive. when
* attempts are made to write sensitive data, the instrumentation
* will generate an alert. The alert can be used as a basis for
* prevent the an actual write to sdtout, a data file, a network
* socket, or a pipe.
*/
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
/* initialize symbol processing */
PIN_InitSymbols();
/* initialize Pin; optimized branch */
if (unlikely(PIN_Init(argc, argv)))
/* Pin initialization failed */
goto err;
/* initialize the core tagging engine */
if (unlikely(libdft_init() != 0))
/* failed */
goto err;

/* Instrument System calls of interest

*/

/* read(2) */
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_read], post_read_hook);
/* readv(2) */
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_readv], post_readv_hook);
/* write(2) */
(void)syscall_set_pre(&syscall_desc[__NR_write],pre_write_hook);
// NEW FUNCTION
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_write], post_write_hook);

/* socket(2), accept(2), recv(2), recvfrom(2), recvmsg(2)
*/
/* send(2), sendto(2), sendmsg(2)
*/
if (net.Value() != 0) {
(void)syscall_set_pre(&syscall_desc[__NR_socketcall],
pre_socketcall_hook);
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_socketcall],
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post_socketcall_hook);
}
/* dup(2), dup2(2) */
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_dup], post_dup_hook);
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_dup2], post_dup_hook);
/* close(2) */
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_close], post_close_hook);
/* open(2), creat(2) */
/* use post_open_hook calls as fds are needed for tagging

*/

if (fs.Value() != 0) {
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_open],
post_open_hook);
(void)syscall_set_post(&syscall_desc[__NR_creat],
post_open_hook);
}
/* add stdin to the interesting descriptors set */
if (sin.Value() != 0)
fdset.insert(STDIN_FILENO);
/* Initialize xml library and check for version mismatches

*/

LIBXML_TEST_VERSION
/* start Pin */
PIN_StartProgram();
/* typically not reached; make the compiler happy */
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
err:

/* error handling */
/* detach from the process */
libdft_die();

}

/* return */
return EXIT_FAILURE;

The first section of main() initializes the Pin instrumentation, first by
initializing the symbols and then the Pin software. Next, the libdft software is
initialized using the libdft_init() function. In the libdft_init() function, the Pin
software is configured to inspect assembly language instructions.
After the initialization, Pin is configured to instrument specific system calls.
First, the read and readv system calls are instrumented after the functions are
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executed, so that the enforcement mechanism can determine how many bytes
have been read. This allows the mechanism to tag all of the bytes that are read
from a sensitive source. Then, Pin is configured to instrument the write system
calls both before and after execution. Before the write function is executed, the
enforcement mechanism can check to see if any of the data to be written are
tagged, allowing it to prevent any unwanted operations from actually taking
place. Instrumenting the write after the operation permits the enforcement
mechanism to clear the output buffer after a write, along with the corresponding
tag bits.
The next section is used to configure the instrumentation of the network
communications. A single socketcall function is used for multiple purposes, so
instrumentation before and after execution is necessary because the function is
used for both read and write operations. The instrumentation strategy used for
the socket read and write operations is similar to the one used for the read and
write system calls. In this version, network sockets can be specified as nonsensitive using an optional input parameter when the libdft-um program is
started.
A file descriptor can be duplicated, resulting in multiple references to a
data source or destination. The duplication is done using dup or dp2 system
calls. The enforcement mechanism adds the duplicate of the sensitive file
descriptor to the list of those that are monitored.
Next, when a file is closed, the operating system removes its file
descriptor from the open file descriptors table and similarly, the enforcement
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mechanism also removes the file descriptor from the monitored list. Any data
that have been read from this file that still reside in memory retain their tags.
For this proof of concept research, the open and create system call
instrumentation is significant because it demonstrates the capability that is
essential for automatic enforcement. (With this version of code, the file open and
create instrumentation can also be disabled by using an optional input parameter
when the libdft-um program is started.) The details of the open system call
instrumentation are described below.
Next, the standard interfaces can be designated as sensitive (stdin,
stdout, and stderr) by including an input parameter when starting libdft-um.
Ultimately, this would be specified in a policy license. When designated as
sensitive, any data input from stdin is tagged.
The enforcement mechanism uses the libxml2 library and it must be
initialized before use. This is done using the LIBXML_TEST_VERSION function.
After all of the initialization and specification of the instrumentation to be
applied, then the execution is started using the PIN_StartProgram() function call.
Now, we examine the characteristics of the major system call instrumentation
routines.
post_open_hook
The post_open_hook() routine plays a key role in the automatic operation
of the enforcement mechanism; it is executed immediately after the open system
call is executed so that the file descriptor for the newly opened file is defined.
The key operations are described below.
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/*
*
* whenever open(2)/creat(2) is invoked,
* add the descriptor inside the monitored
* set of descriptors if the licenses dictate so
* or, if no license exists also add to list.
*
*
* NOTE: it does not track dynamic shared
* libraries
*/
static void
post_open_hook(syscall_ctx_t *ctx)
{
const char *pattern = SENSITIVITY;
// xml file pattern of interest
const char *sens_string = SENSITIVE; // xml string for sensitive info
xmlDocPtr xmldoc;
xmlChar * xml_string;
// pointer to pointer of xmldoc string in memory
char * xml_substring;
// pointer to second line of xmldoc
int xml_string_size;
char str_ret[10];
char str_filename[128];
char str_flags[10];
int num_chars_diff;

//DIAGNOSTIC
//Used for license filename
// used for xml string compare

sprintf(str_ret, "%d", ctx->ret);
//DIAGNOSTIC - fd of opened file
sprintf(str_flags, "%d",ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1]);
/* not successful; optimized branch */
if (unlikely((long)ctx->ret < 0))
return;
/* ignore dynamic shared libraries */
if (strstr((char *)ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG0], DLIB_SUFF) == NULL &&
strstr((char *)ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG0], DLIB_SUFF_ALT) == NULL)
{
/* determine if a license is available */
LOG("..... post_open_hook - fn: " + string(str_ret) + "\n");
strncpy(str_filename, (char *)ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG0],120);
LOG("......opened filename: " + string(str_filename) + "\n");
/* -- generate license file name using opened filename-strcat(str_filename, ".lic");

*/

/* extract the portion of license dealing with sensitivity
*/
xmldoc = extractFile(str_filename, (const xmlChar *)pattern);
if(xmldoc != NULL) {
LOG(".......examining license file: " + string(str_filename) +
"\n");
/* copy xmldoc to string in memory */
xmlDocDumpMemory(xmldoc, &xml_string, &xml_string_size);
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/* set pointer to first delimiter '<' */
xml_substring = strchr((char *)xml_string, '<');
/* set point to second delimeter '<' */
xml_substring = strchr(xml_substring + 1, '<');
/* compare with reference to determine sensitivity */
num_chars_diff = strncmp(xml_substring, sens_string, 50);
if(num_chars_diff == 0) {
LOG(".......file - " + string(str_filename) +
" - is sensitive \n");
fdset.insert((int)ctx->ret);
}
else {

// Add to interesting file list

LOG(".......file - " + string(str_filename) +
" - is not sensitive \n");

}
/* housekeeping here for xml functions */
xmlFreeDoc(xmldoc);
}
else {

/* case of file with no license - treat as sensitive */
fdset.insert((int)ctx->ret);
// Add to interesting file list

}

}

}

After initialization and extraction of the system call parameters, the routine uses
the name of the file just opened to form the corresponding license filename.
Then, the routine attempts to open the license file and extract the specific XML
file entry pointed to by the pattern pointer. This operation generates a
subdocument, which is then parsed to determine the sensitivity value. If no valid
license file is available, then the file is considered sensitive.
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post_read_hook
The post_open_hook() routine is where data input from files are tagged.
The data are tagged if the file being read is one that has been designated as
sensitive. The key operations are described below.
/*
* The read system call will be one potential source
* of data that must be controlled by the usage management
* enforcement mechanism. Policy data associated with the
* data read in will be used to determine whether or not usage
* management enforcement is necessary.
*
* read(2) handler (tagged data - source)
*/
static void
post_read_hook(syscall_ctx_t *ctx)
{
char str_arg0[10], str_arg1[20], str_ret[10];
//DIAGNOSTIC
sprintf(str_arg0, "%d", ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG0]);
//DIAGNOSTIC
sprintf(str_arg1, "%x", ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1]);
//DIAGNOSTIC
sprintf(str_ret, "%d", ctx->ret);
//DIAGNOSTIC
/* read() was not successful; optimized branch */
if (unlikely((long)ctx->ret <= 0))
return;
/* tagged data source */
/* Is the file one of the interesting data sources being tracked?

*/

LOG("......post_read_hook fn: " + string(str_arg0) + " \n"); //DIAGNOSTIC
if (fdset.find(ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG0]) != fdset.end())
{
LOG(".....post_read_hook: tagmap_setn addr: " + string(str_arg1) +
" size: " + string(str_ret) + " \n");
// Diagnostic
/* set the tag bits */
tagmap_setn(ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1], (size_t)ctx->ret);
/* diagnostic to verify tag bits are set */

}
else
{

if (tagmap_issetn(ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1], (size_t)ctx->ret) != 0)
LOG(" ***** Tagged data verified \n");

LOG("\t post_read_hook: not an interesting source - clear tags \n"); //
Diagnostic
LOG(".....post_read_hook: tagmap_clrn addr: " + string(str_arg1) +
" size: " + string(str_ret) + " \n");
// Diagnostic
/* clear the tag markings */
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}

}

tagmap_clrn(ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1], (size_t)ctx->ret);

Much of the code of the post_read_hook() routine is for diagnostics. The
function uses system call parameters: file descriptor and buffer address, and the
return value: number of bytes read, to set tag bits associated with the buffer
addresses. If the file is one that is deemed sensitive, the bits are set, otherwise,
they are cleared. The clear operation is necessary for application software that is
opening and closing files on a repetitive basis, as the memory used for buffers
will be reallocated and if there is a mix of sensitive and non-sensitive data, then
non-sensitive data will be tagged as sensitive.
pre_write_hook
For effective control of sensitive data, the enforcement action must be performed
before a write takes place. The basic operation is described below.
/*
* This is a function that is used to detect and prevent unauthorized
* transmission of data that must be controlled, in order to enforce
* usage policies. This instrumentation function is executed before the
* actual write takes place.
*
* write(2) handler (tests for tagged data ) BEFORE EXECUTION !!
*/
static void
pre_write_hook(syscall_ctx_t *ctx)
{
char str_arg0[10],str_arg1[20], str_arg2[10];
sprintf(str_arg0, "%d", ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG0]);
sprintf(str_arg1, "%x", ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1]);
sprintf(str_arg2, "%d", ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG2]);

//DIAGNOSTIC
//DIAGNOSTIC
//DIAGNOSTIC
//DIAGNOSTIC

LOG(".........entering pre_write_hook fn: " + string(str_arg0) +"\n");
LOG("---> pre_write_hook: tagmap_issetn test - Address: " +
string(str_arg1) + " Size: " + string(str_arg2) + "\n"); //DIAGNOSTIC
/* check the tag markings */
if (tagmap_issetn(ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1], ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG2]) != 0) {
LOG("***** Tagged data being written at Address " + string(str_arg1) +
" Size: " + string(str_arg2) + "\n");
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//

tagmap_setn(ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG1], ctx->arg[SYSCALL_ARG2]);
// if some set, set all
LOG("********* ALERT!! ***********\n");
/* A FORCED RETURN FROM THE SYSTEM CALL WOULD GO HERE */

}

}

As in the post_read_hook() routine, most of the code in the
pre_write_hook() routine is for post-experiment verification of proper operation.
The basic function that this routine does is check the entire content of the output
buffer to determine if any tag bits are set. This approach is used to ensure that
sensitive data are not encapsulated with non-sensitive data. A more
conservative approach would be to tag all of the buffer contents as sensitive, if
any of the contents are tagged. Once tagged data are detected, a forced return
from the system call could be inserted as shown, thus preventing an
unauthorized write.
_socketcall_hook
The enforcement mechanism uses two instrumentation routines:
pre_socketcall_hook() and post_socketcall_hook(), in a manner similar to the
pre_write_hook() and post_read_hook(). As mentioned before, a single
socketcall is used for a number of functions, which are specified by one of the
parameters when calling the routine. When data are to be sent out through the
network socket, they must be checked before the send takes place, so the
pre_socketcall_hook() routine takes action if a send, sendmsg, or sendto
operation is requested. The post_socketcall_hook() routine will tag incoming
data for recv, recvmsg, or recvfrom operations. The post_socketcall_hook also
performs initialization functions, similar to the post_open_hook() routine.
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These descriptions provide a high-level view of the usage management
enforcement mechanism operations. To summarize, the concept of operations is
to use licenses to specify usage policy for data and encapsulate an application
with instrumentation software to enforce the policies. The enforcement is done
by tagging data that requires control, tracking the flow of the data, and then
permitting or denying the flow of information to other destinations.
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